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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001733

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: UNAMI PRESENTS DISPUTED INTERNAL BOUNDARIES PHASE
I REPORTS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1720 AND PREVIOUS (KIRKUK ELECTIONS
PROPOSAL)
[1](#)B. BAGHDAD OI JUNE 4

Classified By: Senior Adviser Thomas Krajewski for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: United Nations Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) presented its analysis of four initial districts and an overview paper describing its Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) process and methodology to the Presidency Council, Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani on June 5. It also issued a press release detailing its findings, with an emphasis that the ultimate decisions are up to the Iraqi government. Reaction is fairly muted, at least publicly in the press, with the exception of some negative Kurdish reaction. UNAMI is continuing work on other disputed districts and on the status of Kirkuk (Phases II and III), and hopes to have reports ready in the coming weeks. End Summary.

UNAMI Announces Phase I

[1](#)2. (C) On June 5, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Iraq Staffan de Mistura presented UNAMI's first analysis (aka Phase I) to the Government of Iraq regarding possible processes to resolve disputed internal boundaries. It presented separate analytical reports on four disputed districts to the Presidency Council, the Prime Minister and the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister, together with a "chapeau" paper outlining UNAMI's methodology. UNAMI previewed these reports with the government, and on June 5 delivered the final products. De Mistura did not attempt to convene the group together for discussions.

[1](#)3. (SBU) In its press release, de Mistura stated, "I want to stress that the Government of Iraq alone has the sovereign responsibility to decide on the process and methodology used to address disputed internal boundaries. UNAMI's aim in preparing and presenting this analysis is merely to contribute to the development of processes to resolve these complicated and sensitive issues." Its reports emphasized "a series of specific confidence building measures (CBMs) designed to assist with the handling of the administrative jurisdiction of the districts in dispute, provide security to all Iraqis living in the disputed territories, and create momentum towards a wider political agreement that includes each disputed district."

Process and Methodology

[1](#)4. (U) In both the chapeau and its the press release, UNAMI outlined its process and methodology in studying each district. Their lines of inquiry included:

-- Administrative history, including past Revolutionary Command Council Decisions and Republican Decrees;

-- Changes since March 2003;

-- Government service delivery, particularly when there is unpredictable funding and resource distribution from the GOI and via the KRG;

-- Demographics and the December 2005 elections, including the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs);

-- Socio-economic conditions;

-- Claims and compensation; and

-- Security conditions;

-- the identification of confidence-building measures tailored to the unique circumstances of each area, including the protection of minorities.

Four Initial Districts

15. (SBU) For Phase I, UNAMI chose four initial districts for study, through which UNAMI aimed to develop a methodology which could be applied to these and other disputed areas for the consideration of the GOI. In each of its four to five page reports, UNAMI provided analysis on the district's circumstances and history, as well as a detailed listing of possible confidence building measures (CBMs) that could be undertaken. Careful in its language to make clear that any

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decision had to be made by GOI and KRG, UNAMI recommended the following:

-- Akre to KRG: that the administration of Akre district in Ninewa province be officially transferred to Dohuk province in the KRG;

-- Hamdaniya remains: that Ninewa province should continue administering Hamdaniya district in Ninewa province, with emphasis on CBMS, security and the protection of minorities;

-- Makhmour to KRG: that the administration of Makhmour district be restored to Erbil province in the KRG, with the "exception of Qaraj sub-district which may be better administered through another neighbouring district and governorate."

-- Mandali remains: that Diyala province should continue administering Mandali sub-district in Diyala province.

Phases II and III Are Next and Even More Difficult,
Especially Kirkuk

16. (C) UNAMI is conducting ongoing analyses for the so-called Phase II districts, including Tal Afar, Tilkaif, Shekhan, and Sinjar districts in the Ninewa governorate and the Khanaqin district in Diyala. De Mistura told Senior Adviser Krajewski that he hopes to have these district analyses completed by the end of June, and the Phase III paper on the status of Kirkuk finished in July. UNAMI DSRSG for Political Affairs Andrew Gilmour told us UNAMI agonized over appropriately including language on Kirkuk in its press release, mindful of how the communities would react. Consideration was also given to whether to address provincial elections in Kirkuk, given the recent controversy over a proposal to treat Kirkuk differently in the draft provincial elections law (ref a). UNAMI decided not to mention elections in Kirkuk, and emphasized instead working with all communities on CBMs and assisting with the "finalization of such steps in the areas of power-sharing, security arrangements, including

community-based policing, the delivery of public goods and services, the handling of detainees, language rights, and the distribution of government posts." Its press release also noted that UNAMI has also started working on a series of possible scenarios and options for resolving the administrative jurisdiction and status of Kirkuk governorate, "within a political and constitutional process that would be acceptable to the major stakeholders."

Initial Public Reaction Muted So Far; Some Kurds Not Happy

¶17. (C) Initial public reaction appears to be fairly muted, at least in public, with thus far straightforward press reporting on the UNAMI announcement. Media reported that Council of Representatives member Mahmoud Othman (Kurdistan Alliance) termed the UNAMI recommendations as disappointing, adding that the recommendations cannot solve the problem. In press statements, Othman said that the recommendations are proof that the UN mission's staff is not aware of the dimensions of the dispute in these areas and the extent of its impact on the Iraqi arena. He voiced fear that the recommendations would cause problems among political parties and called them interference in Iraqi affairs. Press has not reported any reaction from other political parties.

¶18. (C) An agitated KRG Minister for Extra-Regional Affairs Mohammed Ihsan called Poloff late June 6 to state that UNAMI's reports were "bad" and that he was "very disappointed." He complained about UNAMI's methodology, arguing that UNAMI did not pay enough attention to the 2005 election results and the reversal of Revolutionary Command Council decisions as the main criteria, instead relying on several factors. He stated that "we must go back to the referendum and the census," which we (the Kurds) can do at any time. Referring particularly to the idea that the Arab-dominated Qaraj sub-district in Makhmour district not join the KRG, he said UNAMI just "wanted the Arabs to be happy," and that he told de Mistura that the reports "smell of Arab capitulation." He claimed that "people back home" are mad about it and UNAMI's work was "unacceptable." During a June 5 meeting with UNAMI, Deputy SRSG Gilmour told us that Ihsan said Qaraj was "better off" in the GOI and that he was more concerned about Phase II, which echoes Ihsan's June 4 comments to Senior Adviser. Gilmour said Ihsan had not called UNAMI since the June 5 meeting.

Comment

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¶19. (C) Political reaction to these reports is still developing and will probably change over the coming days and weeks. As for the Kurdish initial response, Ihsan was his typically hot-headed self. We will need to see what their reaction really is as we talk to Kurdish leaders in the coming days, as well as the reaction of the other communities. BUTENIS